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Abstract. The implementation of decentralization in Indonesia brings two-fold effects. On the one hand, it has given more
autonomy for regions to organize and manage their governmental affairs. However, on the other hand, regional autonomy
causes problems in society, such as increased corruption, money politics, and environmental damage. By using descriptivequalitative approach, the author evaluated the implementation of forestry decentralization in Indonesia with research focus
in Manggarai and Central Maluku districts. This study found that the implementation of forestry decentralization ignored
community involvement thus brought negative consequences such as the increasing damage to forest ecosystems and the
declining public welfare. Therefore, in order to bring benefits for forest conservation and welfare of the community, forestry
decentralization needs to fortify community involvement.
Keywords: forest decentralization, forest degradation, fortification of community involvement, social welfare
Abstrak. Penyelenggaraan desentralisasi di Indonesia telah membawa dampak yang mendua. Pada satu sisi, desentralisi
telah memberi otonomi yang lebih luas kepada daerah otonom untuk mengatur dan mengurus berbagai urusan pemerintahan
yang dimilikinya. Namun, di pihak lain, otonomi daerah justru telah menimbulkan masalah di dalam masyarakat, seperti
meningkatnya korupsi, politik uang, dan kerusakan lingkungan. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan deskriptif-kualitatif, penulis
mengevaluasi penyelenggaraan desentralisasi kehutanan di Indonesia dengan lokus penelitian di Indonesia Bagian Timur,
khususnya kabupaten Manggarai dan Maluku Tengah. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa penyelenggaraan desentralisasi
kehutanan mengabaikan keterlibatan masyarakat sehingga membawa akibat negatif berupa meningkatnya kerusakan
eksosistem hutan dan menurunnya kesejahteraan masyarakat. Oleh karena itu, agar penyelenggaraan desentralisasi kehutanan
membawa manfaat bagi kelestarian hutan dan kesejahteraan masyarakat, perlu diupayakan fortifikasi peran masyarakat
dalam desentralisasi kehutanan.
Kata kunci: desentralisasi kehutanan, fortifikasi peran masyarakat, kerusakan lingkungan, menurunnya kesejahteraan
masyarakat

INTRODUCTION
Indonesia ranks third after Brazil and the Republic of
Congo as a country that has the largest tropical forest in the
world, as large as 90.1 million hectares (Brockhaus et al.,
2012). Since the time of the kingdoms, Indonesia’s forests
have been continuously threatened by deforestation and
forest degradation caused by forest fires, legal and illegal
logging (Noordwijk, et al., 2008; Simon, 2008; Tolo,
2012). Deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia
is considered as a result of bad policies (implementation)
in the forestry sector that tends to be centralized, ignoring
the role of society, and use a purely economic approach
(Yustika, 2009; Awang, 2006). As a result, the richness
of forest resources seems to bring no benefit for public
welfare. In economic literature, the fact is called a
resource curse or Dutch disease (Yustika, 2009).
If the root causes of deforestation and forest degradation
lies in the realm of policy (implementation), then a policy
reform is a conditio sine qua non. In Indonesia, since
the independence, the dynamics of centralization and
decentralization of forestry policy changed to seven times

(Siswanto and Wardojo, 2006; Ekawati, 2010). When the
New Order authoritarian regime collapsed, the government
reformed centralized forest policy to decentralized one.
However, the post-New Order decentralized policy also
failed, characterized by the increasing deforestation and
forest degradation. According to the author, the failure
of forestry decentralization in Indonesia, besides due to
misinterpretation of the meaning of decentralization, is
also caused by the neglect of public participation in forest
governance.
After the collapse of the New Order, the new government
is committed to build democracy through political and
policy reforms (Boediono, 2009). The political system is
changed from centralization to decentralization with the
issuance of Law no. 22/1999 on Regional Government.
The goal of decentralization is to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of public services, reduce public spending
of the central government, and tackle the disintegration
of the nation (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 2006). In the
forestry sector, decentralization has liberated autonomous
regions to manage their own forest resources. However,
forestry decentralization, believed to bring positive
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effect on regional development, was not actualized. In
contrast, forestry decentralization has led to corruption,
abuse of authority, and increasing deforestation and forest
degradation.
The policy to give license to cooperatives to manage
the 100-hectare forests without the supervision of the
department of forestry allegedly resulted on the increasing
deforestation. Another cause was the increasing logging
activity on the former territory of forest concessions
(HPH) and forest conversion for transmigration areas,
illegal logging, agricultural land clearing, smallholders,
private estates, forest fires and land disputes between
logging companies and indigenous people (Awang,
2006). As a result, in the post-New Order, the rate of
forest degradation that previously only reached 800,000900,000 per year in 1997 to 1.8 million hectares in 2001
and reached 3.8 million hectares per year in 2003-2004
(Siahaan, 2007). The facts of increasing deforestation
and forest degradation after the implementation of Law
no. 22 of 1999 indicates that the change in the political
system and the forestry decentralization have brought
new problems for forest management in Indonesia.
To rectify the shortcomings of Law No. 22 of 1999, the
Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government was formed.
Based on Law No. 32 of 2004 and Law No. 41 of 1999
on Forestry, the governance of forest sector becomes the
responsibility of local governments within the framework
of the unitary state. Both regulations provide a strong
juridical basis for local governments to manage their
forest resources for the preservation and enhancement
of regional development while keeping its accountability
to the public and accounting for the central government.
However, the presence of Law No. 32 of 2004 and
Law No. 41 of 1999 did not make forest governance in
Indonesia better. The problem of deforestation and forest
degradation still occurs despite the slight decline. The rate
of deforestation of 1.7 million hectares per year in 20042006 declined to 0.5 million hectares per year in 20092011 (Tolo, 2012).
Based on previous studies (Yustika, 2009; Larson,
2006; Siswanto and Wardojo, 2006), the failure of
the decentralization policy in Indonesia is due to the
following three factors: First, local governments use
purely economic approach to forest governance (Yustika,
2009; Larson, 2006). Second, the failure of forestry
decentralization is also caused by a faulty interpretation
of the concept of decentralization. Larson (2006 ) refers
to this phenomenon as the “contradictory political
interpretation” since the local governments interpret
decentralization as a self-authority, apart from the central
government. Third, forestry decentralization in Indonesia
is characterized by a weak central government control
(Larson, 2006). Control in this case means that the central
government should oversee the implementation of the
decentralization of forestry to conform to the established
juridical corridor. For example, local government gave
non-procedural license of forestry concessions and tax in
order to reap high economic profits. In some autonomous
regions in Indonesia, authorities seized and sold public
land to entrepreneurs for economic benefits (Siswanto
dan Wardojo, 2006; Tolo, 2014).
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Essentially, decentralization is often defined as the
transfer of authority or power sharing from the central to
local governments (Dwiyanto et al, 2003), it is commonly
born as a result of a national crisis, initiatives at both central
and local elites, and pressure from international donors
(Larson, 2006; Agrawal and Ostorm, 2008). Whatever
the background that gave it birth, decentralization is
considered important, because from political science
perspective, decentralization is believed to facilitate
the development of democracy. Meanwhile, from the
perspective of public administration, decentralization
makes the bureaucrats closer to society and more efficient
and effective in providing public services (Kristiansen
and Pratikno, 2006). Thus, decentralization is believed
to ‘encourage development by improving efficiency,
equality and democracy’ (Larson, 2006).
Due to the positive promise of decentralization, many
countries in the world in the 1960s and 1970s, having
had their forests managed centrally, temptingly shifted
to forestry decentralization since the late 1980s. In the
early 21st century, about 80 percent of countries in the
world have chosen a decentralized government system.
Consequently, forest resource managements are also
decentralized (Agrawal and Ostorm, 2008; Shivakoti
and Ostorm, 2008; Moeliono et al, 2009). In the past 20
years, about 200 million hectares of forest managements
are decentralized, involving communities in almost 60
countries in the world (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009).
Forestry decentralization has brought a positive effect on
forest conservation and community welfare.
According to previous studies (Ostorm, 1990; Larson,
2006; Agrawal and Ostorm, 2008; Yonariza and Shivakoti,
2008; Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009), decentralization
has brought a positive effect on forest conservation
and community welfare. Ostorm (1990) proved that a
decentralized forest governance (the commons) through
local institution empowerment will enhance collective
action to keep and maintain forests. According to Larson
(2006), a decentralization that allows local participation
has a positive effect on forest conservation and community
welfare. Yonariza and Shivakoti (2008), prove that the
involvement of local communities and institutions in
decentralized forest governance, especially in terms of
guarding and regulating in the province of West Sumatra,
had positive implications for the economic improvement
of the population in the surrounding forests and the
preservation of forest sustainability. By conducting
researches in India, Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia,
and Vietnam, Agrawal and Ostorm (2008) explains that
decentralization will be successful if accompanied by the
development of community-based forestry, governed by a
lucid forest tenure, capable of encouraging joint action to
preserve and protect the forest. Meanwhile, the research
by Chhatre and Agrawal (2009)—in 80 forests in 10
countries: 22 in East Africa, 13 in Latin America, and 45
in South Asia—found that the higher the local autonomy
for forest governance, the higher the sustainability of
forest and welfare of the community.
The success of forestry decentralization is also
determined by the public participation in forest governance.
P. Francis and R. James, as cited by Kristiansen and
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Pratikno (2006: 119), asserts that “democracy and
accountability of true autonomous regions is found only in
changes of values and consciousness as well as the growth
of an active civil society.” An active community enables
a more accountable and democratic forest governance.
In addition to be actively engaged in monitoring,
conservation and utilization of forest resources, people
must be active in controlling government’s role in forest
governance. The active involvement of the community
will have a positive implication on economic welfare.
The economic welfare becomes the common interest
for community to participate in the joint actions of
maintenance and protection of forests (Ostorm, 1990).
Society can only be active in forest governance
and enjoy its economic prosperity, provided that
decentralization works for a lucid forest ownership. The
clarity of the ownership allows communities to engage in
forest governance in three areas: management, ownership
and utilization (Agrawal and Ostorm, 2008). Based on the
research by Larson (2006), if the right of ownership and
authority over forests is obscure, forest conditions tend
to be negative. This is due to public suspicion against
the government who tends to exploit the forest without
positively and economically contribute to the social life.
In addition, local governments feel that their forests are
threatened by the presence of the central government who
tends to excessively exploit without taking into account
sustainability aspects.
Public participation will be more effective and efficient,
and affect forest sustainability provided that local wisdom
in society is accommodated in the regulation of the forestry
sector (Johnestone, 2010). In West Sumatra, the local
wisdom of Nagari, accommodated in local regulations on
forestry, has contributed positively to forest preservation
and economic improvement of the local people (Yonariza
and Shivakoti, 2008). However, the local wisdom must
be critically installed in various forest policies through
rational political considerations, since local wisdom
is the result of a power struggle between different
actors in society. If this is not anticipated seriously,
in its implementation, local wisdom can be used as an
instrument of elite capture (Dutta, 2009).
Elite capture is a latent danger, continuously
threatening the implementation of decentralization
(forestry decentralization). Dutta (2009) asserts that
“one of the negative impacts of decentralization is the
emergence of the phenomenon of elite capture, especially
in developing countries.” In Indonesia, according to
previous studies (Hadiz 2005, Chowdhury and Yamauchi,
2010), decentralization has given rise to elite capture by
the emergence of small kings in the autonomous regions,
acting authoritatively and prone to corruption, collusion,
and nepotism (KKN). Therefore, in order to make forestry
decentralization effective and efficient, the central
government needs to do controlling, coordination and
evaluation of the local governments, to make sure they
are not caught up in elite capture because of its power
(Larson, 2006). However, the controlling of the central
government is ‘only’ to make sure local governments
perform the duties and obligations in accordance with
the mandate of the applicable laws. This is important to
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prevent forestry decentralization from getting trapped
into ‘centralized decentralization’ (Shivakoti and Ostorm,
2008) which was no different from the centralized forestry,
as happened in the government of Mali and Nicaragua,
where forestry decentralization actually increased the
state control over forest resources management (Larson,
2006). Once the state control over forest resources is
very high, it is vulnerable to land grabbing, commonly
occurring in developing countries, such as Indonesia
(Tolo, 2014), both by the state and by the capitalists allied
with the state (Boras dan Franco, 2011).
RESEARCH METHODS
This research uses qualitative research methodology.
Even though more time is required for field research,
qualitative methodology is capable of revealing the
facts on the field more thoroughly by conducting a
literary study, observation and in-depth interviews in
order to understand a concept, definition, characteristics,
metaphors, symbols and descriptions about something in
research location (Berg, 1989). To be more focused, this
qualitative-descriptive study uses a case study, since it
enables the researcher to explore the differences between
two or more cases. By comparing cases of different
research locations, the researcher is capable to infer a
more comprehensive conclusion (Yin, 2003).
This qualitative-descriptive research, through a case
study, was conducted in the period of 2007-2010 in two
different districts in eastern Indonesia, the Manggarai and
Central Maluku districts. The reasons the author chose
Manggarai and Central Maluku districts are: (1) the two
districts have the primary forest potential, threatened
by deforestation, both legal and illegal. (2) the Forests
in these two small islands (Flores and Seram) have the
primary forest potential, whose existence is threatened.
So far, researches on forestry tend to focus on the larger
islands such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and
Papua. In fact, small islands in Indonesia also have a good
potential of the primary forest, which should be preserved
and maintained for the development of the nation and
public welfare.
The research in Manggarai was conducted with two
field trips for a month in 2007 and a week in 2008. The
research in Central Maluku was conducted in 2008, 2009
and 2010. In the first two years (2008 and 2010), the author
was on the field for a week. In 2010, the author conducted
data collection in the field for a month. Data collection,
both in Manggarai and Central Maluku districts, was
conducted through in-depth interviews and observations.
The in-depth interviews were conducted for 1-2 hours
in average, with about 60 respondents. The respondents
were employees at public institutions (such as Bappeda,
Office of Forestry, Laboratory of Manusela National
Parks and Ruteng Nature Recreation Park), community
leaders, NGO activists, academicians, religious leaders,
farmers, fishermen, timber companies, illegal loggers.
Considering that the research location is foreign for
the author, the snow bowling method was used to get
informants. The method asks recommendations from
informants who had been interviewed in order to get a
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new respondent. This method is very helpful for the
researcher, but may at the same time reduce the plurality
of perspectives on the reality under study, because the
informants asked tended to recommend his acquaintance
with similar and consistent way of thinking. The author
also performed data triangulation by asking the same
questions over and over again to different informants
to obtain data validity. This data triangulation is only
one out of four types of triangulation as suggested by
Denzin (1978), i.e. the data triangulation, investigator
triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological
triangulation.
In addition to conducting literary studies—reading
relevant sources of books, journals, newspapers, internet,
data and reports from government agencies—and indepth interviews, the author also conducted involvedobservation by staying with the local community for
some time. In Manggarai, in 2007, the author lived for
a week with Colol community. In Central Maluku, the
author lived about a month with the community of Sawai,
following their life-routines in terms of their relationship
with the forests, especially Manusela National Park,
located about half a kilometer from their settlements. The
author also briefly followed the operation of arresting
illegal loggers with the forestry police the Manusela
National Park.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The forest area in Manggarai is 121,192.05 ha (see
table 1). However, its existence is threatened by illegal
and legal logging. As a result, in 2005 the area of forest
was degraded by 14. 218.50 ha. Illegal logging is normally
done by the community for domestic needs such as
building the house, yet merely on a small scale. However,
there are some groups of people who sell illegal timber.
Factors affecting illegal logging are: (1) unclear forest
boundaries between customary forests, called Lingko,
and state forests, (2) the increase of population, and (3)
the road access passing through the forest area.
Communities in Manggarai still referred to the
forest boundary made by the Dutch. In the 1970s, local
governments set on a new boundary. However, this
attempt got a negative reaction from the communities,
since the government did not engage the communities
and traditional leaders (tua golo and tua teno) in setting
the new forest boundary. Increasing population also has
implications on the expansion of agricultural land area.
The area of forest (2008) occupied for burial, residences
(villages) and plantations is as large as 9,004.50 ha. The
road access to the forestry area also results in rampant
practices of illegal logging. Illegally logged timbers are
exported to Java through ports in Borong and Reo.
The legal logging was conducted by mining companies.
The mining exploration by PT Surya in Galak Rego-Reo
forest, for example, has led to massive deforestation that
have an impact on the damage of other ecosystems such
as the sea and river and the loss of some springs. In 2008,
of 22 mining permits, approximately 5 explorations have
been executed, all mining locations of which are in the
forest area. The local government is very supportive to
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Table 1. the Area and Types of Forets in Manggarai
District.
No. Forest Area
Area (ha)
Type of forest
1.
Gapong
952.36
Conservation
2.
Meler-Kuwus
3,040
Conservation
3.
Todo
10,089.20
Conservation
4.
Manus Mbengan
3,688.28
Production
5.
Rana
253.81
Production
6.
Riwo
1,011.47
Production
7.
Ngada Wolo Mera
4,898.80
Conservation
8.
Puntu
15,567.40
Conservation
9.
Pota
16,715.07
Conservation
10. Nggalak Rego
14,690.30
Conservation
11. Ndeki Komba
5,281.70
Conservation
12. Ramut
2,400
Conservation
13. Wae Laku
5,705
Production
14. Sawe Sange
4,650
Conservation
15. TWA Ruteng
32,248.60
Conservation
Source: Manggarai Office of Forestry 2008
mining explorations. In fact, economically, in the last
three years (2005-2007), the revenues from mining sector
for Locally Generated Revenue (PAD) was only 321
million rupiahs.
The forest area in Central Maluku district is 746,471
ha. Its existence is threatened by illegal and legal logging.
Illegal logging is done by the public and government
officials (police and military). However, illegal logging
is conducted by the public only in small quantities, for
domestic purposes such as to manufacture boats and
houses. However, government officials do illegal logging
in considerably large quantities.
Factors influencing illegal logging are (1) economic
pressures and the demand of timber from the outside,
(2) unclear forest boundaries, (3) increasing number of
inhabitants and transmigration, and (4) indecisive, corrupt
and easily bribed officials.
Due to the economic pressures, illegal logging is done
to get money. The demand for timber from the timber
Table 2. The Area and Types of Forest in Central
Maluku District
District
Central Maluku
Conservation Forest
137,584
Limited Production Forest
180,789
Production Forest
33,331
Conversion Forest
130,250
Manusela National Park
189,000
Nature Preservation
14,234
Other Land Uses
61,283
Total
746,471
Source: Central Maluku Office of Foorestry (2008)
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barons in Masohi, Ambon and Sulawesi with high prices
(IDR 700,000 to IDR1.500.000/cubic) encourages local
people to do illegal logging. The migrants, amounting
to 1,000 people each year in the last 30 years (Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2009) also has implications on the
illegal logging. Some of the migrants are involved in
illegal logging. The boundary of customary forests, called
pertuanan, and state forests is also obscure. Moreover,
people referred more to Dutch-made forest boundary.
The boundary set by the local government is considered
unfair and annexed their pertuanan. In Sawai, the state
forest boundary of Manusela National Park is just 500
meters from the residential areas. In addition, the officials
are not strict in handling cases of illegal logging. Some of
them even become illegal loggers. For example, a soldier
named ‘Labiru’ rented 14 sensor operators to cut down
a tree every day in Manusela National Park around the
village of Saka.
The legal logging was conducted by companies
owning a concession rights from the government. In
1970-1980, forest concessions were granted to Jayanti
Group company, in the late 1980s Brata Jaya company
also obtained concession rights, and in the 2000s, PT Nusa
Ina got concessions of oil palm plantations in the area of
primary forest. The land clearing for transmigration area
had also damaged the forests.
Decentralization in the forestry sector in the two districts
showed the remaining strong dominance of the center
toward the autonomous region. All forestry decisions
and policies are produced in Jakarta. For example, in
terms of determining the type and boundaries, the Head
of Manggarai Office of Forestry said that: “We do not
have the authority, except waiting for the decision of the
Department of Forestry. We were given guidelines for the
determination of forest areas. Then, we give a proposal
to the Department of Forestry in Jakarta. Department of
Forestry itself ultimately decides the boundaries of the
forests under the Law No. 41 of 1999.”
In addition, with regard to the granting of license and
forest concessions, only the Department of Forestry and
related departments are entitled to issue them. Local
governments have no authority whatsoever. Therefore,
should a conflict occurs vertically in the field, as was the
case in Manggarai, the local government becomes the
victim of public anger, yet cannot do many things since
the concession is the authority of the central government.
In Manggarai, mining permits are granted by the central
government upon the recommendation of the local
government. The same thing happened in Central Maluku
district where forest and plantation concessions are given
by the central government. Economically, the granting
of forest concession is more beneficial for the central
government. Therefore, the Head of Central Maluku
Office of Forestry said that “the existence of forest
concessions benefits central government more than local
government because the ecological damage of forests
in the autonomous regions is not balanced by economic
benefits.”
The forest governance in the two districts shows that
people are ‘objectified’. The Government considers
that the public does not have any capability in forest
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governance. In fact, people are criminalized as the
culprit of deforestation. Therefore, some customary land
(lingko and pertuanan) were seized by the government
(land grabbing) with the arguments for maintaining and
preserving the forest. Yet, in reality, the government,
through the concession rights and policies, has led to
massive deforestation.
In Manggarai District in the 1970s, the villagers
in Gapong must allow their 11 lingko to be grabbed by
the local government with the purpose of conservation.
However, in 1982-1985, the local government granted
certain companies the forest concessions of the lingko area
previously grabbed from the people of Gapong village. In
2005, after the forest was cleared away, five villagers from
Gapong dag in the ex-forest concessions area to excavate
rock. However, they were captured and imprisoned.
Similar thing happened in Galak Rego area. In 1962, the
government claimed people’s lingko as protected forests.
However, in early 2000s, the government handed over the
forest for mining exploration to PT Surya. Moreover, the
people of Colol must allow their forests and plantations
to be claimed as the state forest area by the government
in 2002. In 2004, people of Colol who rejected to be
imprisoned and some farmers were shot dead by the
police forces.
In Central Maluku district, the government recognizes
the existence of customary forests (pertuanan). In the data
from the Office of Forestry, pertuanan is included in the
category of “other land uses” with the area of 61,283 ha.
However, in determining the forest boundaries, people
were not involved. Therefore, the boundary set by the local
government tended to harm the public. The government
one-sidedly annexed people’s pertuanan area. The Head
of Central Maluku Office of Forestry revealed that the
government recognized the existence of customary forest,
yet based on Law no. 41 of 1999 on Forestry, the people
only owned the right to use, not owned the customary
forest.
Once the forestry decentralization was implemented,
both vertical and horizontal conflicts related to natural
resources and forests in Manggarai and Central Maluku
districts notably increased. In Manggarai, vertical conflicts
often occurred. For example, the conflict between the
Colol community and police force that killed 6 people
and wounded about a dozen farmers. In addition, in
Satar Teuk Reo, people who disagreed with the presence
of the mining company blocked the road. However, the
government and the company used the military services to
quell the masses. Therefore, there was a conflict between
officers and citizens. Horizontal conflict also occurred
among members of the communities, caused by obscure
land boundaries. The horizontal conflict was referred to as
perang tanding (a duel). Perang tanding between Ngkor
village and Lao village, for example, has caused material
lost and many lives.
In Central Maluku District, the conflict between the
authorities and indigenous people often occurred after the
forest decentralization was implemented, since land and
forests ownership became increasingly obscure. People
who retained ownership of their pertuanan remained
clearing their land and doing forest logging. As a result,
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they were frequently involved in conflicts with authorities
in the field. In addition, horizontal conflicts also occurred.
For example, there were two occurrences of conflict
between people of Soleman and Saka. These conflicts
were due to the program of planting golden teak by the
Office of Forestry. The Office gave the golden teak to
people of Soleman to be planted in the pertuanan of Saka
people, considered to be the state forest area by the local
government. The first conflict broke out on July 10, 2006
and the second conflict occurred on May 2, 2008. As a
result of this conflict, 80 houses were burned, hundreds of
commodity crops were destroyed and there were victims
who got injured.
Decentralization has brought problems related to
forest governance in the two districts (Manggarai and
Central Maluku). However, as written by Hadiz (2005),
decentralization has been hijacked by the local elites
for their own interests (elite capture). In Manggarai,
the district head and officials had “affairs” with mining
companies for economic gain, whereas many of their
people are disenfranchised from their land and forests.
Both horizontal and vertical conflicts added burden of
their lives. Meanwhile, in Central Maluku, the Regent had
an affair with the entrepreneurs to facilitate the clearance
of forestry concessions. In addition, the military and the
police had the freedom to do illegal logging and worked
with timber brokers to smuggle illegal timber to Ambon,
Masohi and even abroad.
Forestry Decentralization has a negative impact on
the development, social welfare and environmental
sustainability in Manggarai and Central Maluku districts.
Does this mean that Indonesia should re-implement a
centralized forestry? Of course not, because forestry
decentralization is a democratic step that must be
maintained. When retracted, Indonesia will tarnish the
democratic progress that has been achieved through
the post-New Order reform. Forestry decentralization
is supposed to bring a positive implication, should it
be implemented earnestly, by involving more public
participation in the forest governance of the regions.
The findings in Manggarai and Central Maluku
districts showed that community involvement in forest
governance is still very minimal. In fact, the essence
of forestry decentralization is to give more space to
the community to be involved in forest governance. As
a result, decentralization becomes the site of a power
struggle and economic rents among the elite groups
(elite capture and land grabbing). As a result, the public
becomes the most tragic casualties of decentralization.
However, the space for public participation will be
more effective and actual if the central government
gives broader rights and authority to local governments
to set their own forests by determining a lucid and firm
authority between central and local governments. In
holding authority, local governments must make room for
the incorporation of local wisdom in forest governance.
Therefore, the culture of ‘barong wae’ in Manggarai district
(valuing a forest as a mother who deserves to be honored)
and the culture of ‘kewang’ and ‘sasi’, that enable the
forest to be sustainably maintained, must be incorporated
to the forestry policies in the region. Moreover, both in
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Manggarai and Central Maluku districts, people are more
adherent to ‘customary law’ than to the government law.
Given this reality, then synergizing customary law and
national law in forest governance, that enables increased
public participation, is urgent and needs to be done by the
local government through lucid and firm public policies.
Nevertheless, although local governments are given a
wide space of autonomy, the central government needs to
keep doing surveillance so that local governments carry
out its duties in accordance with the given authority to
support national development. However, the facts on the
field, to date, indicate that the central government still
holds a very strong control on forest governance in the
regions. On that basis, a journalist in Masohi, Central
Maluku district, asserted that “the Regional Office of
Forestry functions like a ‘trash can’ for the policies of the
Department of Forestry in Jakarta. The Regional Office
of Forestry must not be too passive and just wait for the
program from the Department of Forestry.”
Looking at the aforementioned facts, there are some
fundamental reasons for the public involvements in forest
governance in Indonesia in general and particularly in
Manggarai and Central Maluku districts as the locus of
this study. First, re-mapping of forest boundaries must
involve the communities and custom leaders (tua golo
and tua teno in Manggarai and Saniri in Central Maluku).
The government needs to equalize the perception of forest
boundary that remains obscure and overlapping. Clarity
of forest boundaries implicates clarity of rights and access
to forests. The one-sided delimitation of forests by the
government makes people both in Manggarai and Central
Maluku districts tend to reject the determined forest
boundary and prefer the artificial boundary made by the
Netherlands. A custom leader in Colol, Manggarai district,
recognized this and asserted that “society followed more
the artificial boundary of Netherlands (Dutch Indies) than
the forest boundary made by the local government in the
1970s that did not involve the communities here.”
Second, Manggarai Office of Forestry and Central
Maluku Office of Forestry are equally suffering from the
lack of operational equipment and personnel. In 2008,
officials in Manggarai Office of Forestry was 60 people,
42 of whom worked in the office and the rest of the field.
Around 60% had a background of forestry education and
30% have a background of social sciences, economics,
law and government science. Only about 10% of officers
had bachelor degree. In Central Maluku, in 2010, the
number of officers in the Office of Forestry was 85
people, 55 of whom worked in the office and 30 people in
the field, spread in 10 Sub-districts. In general, the Office
of Forestry in these two districts had limited operational
equipment and personnel. Therefore, public involvement
in forest governance, particularly in the supervision and
protection of the forest, has a positive impact for forest
sustainability.
Third, public involvement in forest governance
can have a positive implication for public welfare. Public
involvement can be done by developing community
forest. Therefore, pertuanan and lingko can be made as
community forests. The local government may make
local regulations guaranteeing the existence and legal
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clarity of the community forests. As community forests,
pertuanan and lingko are managed by the communities
in regards to the preservation, protection and utilization.
However, the local government must guarantee a lucid
forest boundaries so that communities’ rights over forests
are secured.
CONCLUSION
Forestry decentralization in Indonesia was considered
a failure by the findings of the author in Manggarai and
Central Maluku districts. The failure was mainly due to
the remaining strong dominance of the central government
and the abandonment of the public participation in forest
governance by the local government. Nonetheless, the
failure of forestry decentralization is not an excuse for the
government to return to a centralized system such as in
the New Order. Instead, the government should keep and
improve the forestry decentralization since it is a positive
implications of democracy after the collapse of the New
Order.
The steps that need to be taken by the government
to tackle this problem is by implementing forestry
decentralization intelligently and comprehensively by
giving greater authority to autonomous regions and
communities to manage their own forest resources.
Communities need to be involved in forest governance
in terms of surveillance, maintenance, and utilization.
Therefore, the lucid segmentation of the rights and
responsibilities between the central government and local
government as well as between local government and
communities is urgent.
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